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Contracts in the USSR Economy 
 
Economic contracts (khoyastvennye dogovory) have long played a role in the 
management of business relations among Soviet enterprises and organizations.  State 
agencies frequently use contracts in defining the details of economic obligations placed 
on them by the central planning authorities. The typical types of economic contracts 
involve the immediate sale or purchase of goods (kuplya-prodazha), arrangements for the 
delivery of future production (postavka), and the performance of services (podryad).1 
 
Economic contracts for research and development work have existed since the First Five-
Year Plan. However, early R&D contracts were relatively uncommon, marginally 
important and functioned more as a means for adjusting state budget allocations that as 
financial incentives for scientific organizations.2 Following World War II the Soviet 
Communist Party devoted considerably more attention to programs for developing and 
using new technologies. Part of this increased attention led to a series of measures that 
promoted economic contracts for research and development as instruments for obtaining 
more industrially useful technologies from scientific and engineering organizations. 
 
This paper examines the evolution of research and development contracting in the post 
war Soviet Union. In particular, the paper analyzes the legal and economic discussions 
that accompanied numerous changes in the rules for R&D contracts in light of Soviet 
goals for improving research, development and innovation performance of the economy. 
 
The Rise of R&D Contracting 
 
1. A First Step: The Model Contract for Experimental-Design Work 
 
In the mid-1950s, Soviet national leaders concluded that past economic policies were 
insufficient for achieving proper rates of technical innovation, and they began searching 
for special mechanisms for securing technical progress.3 Great importance was attached 
to increasing the scientific and technological interaction among ministries and to 
applying the talents of the scientists and engineers of the educational establishment to 
industrial objectives.4 
 
Many ministries and central agencies, recognizing that their enterprises frequently need 
quick access to the technical expertise of their central design facilities or to the 
production line experience of other related enterprises, had established internal 
regulations for model design and development contracts.5 Innovations, however, 
frequently showed little respect for ministerial boundaries and considerable difficulties 
still existed when enterprises needed to enlist the services of research or design 
organizations subordinated to other ministries. These problems were exacerbated by 
separate – and, perhaps, contradictory – ministerial decrees. Consequently economic 
policy makers began to standardize R&D contracting practices on a national level. 
 
In mid-1955, addressing the problems of inter-ministerial cooperation in technical 
innovation and prodding those agencies that had neglected to establish internal 
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regulations for their own organizations, a national model contract for experimental-
design (opytno-konstruktorsiy) work was promulgated.6 The absence of any standard 
contract in an area where traditional economic contracting practices often proved 
inapplicable had likely discouraged broader participation of design and development 
organizations in significant innovation.7 This model contract standardized important 
considerations – e.g., definition of and recourse for non-fulfillment, establishment of 
performance schedules, identification of responsible parties, regulation of cost estimates, 
etc. “ for the contracting parties and probably removed many of the uncertainties that had 
plagued experimental-design contracting.8 
 
The creation of a model experimental-design contract signaled the start of the use of 
contracts as part of the state-wide efforts to promote enterprise innovation. The model 
experimental-design contract of 1955 was followed several years later by a vigorous 
expansion of national legislation for general research and development contracting. 
 
 2. Expanding Coverage: 
 
 a. Contracts for research and development (1961) 
 
Party leaders, in reforming industrial innovation, decided to shift the financing of R&D 
away from the state budget and toward independent accounting or self-financing 
(khozraschchet). Economic officials viewed state budget financing as the cause of a 
number of the problems encountered in moving new technologies out of the state’s 
laboratories and into production. For example, the central administrative personnel who 
managed the research projects funded from the state budget frequently neglected to 
consult carefully with the potential using enterprises. The shift from budgetary 
allocations to self-financing brought the creators and users of new technologies closer 
together, for enterprises now contracted their R&D work directly with research facilities.9 
Financing from budgetary allocations also made R&D facilities financially independent 
of their customers, i.e., the enterprise using the new technical developments. This 
independence seriously undermined the R&D facilities’ concern about quality or costs. 
Self-financing R&D facilities were, however, expected to finance operating expenses out 
of the revenues earned through contracts. These contracts, therefore, brought R&D 
facilities directly into formal contact with their customers and became instruments for 
controlling both quality and costs. 
 
In 1961 the Council of Ministers issued a series of decrees and model contracts for both 
research and development work, thus strengthening the decision to make R&D facilities 
into self-financing organizations.10 In establishing contracts for R&D, Soviet legislators 
confronted some thorny problems. First, traditional Soviet contracting practices proved of 
limited use, for many of them were simply geared to specifying the details of centrally 
planned deliveries. Economic contracts for planned deliveries differ significantly from 
the contracts for R&D projects, for unlike the arrangements for the delivery of a standard 
industrial product, the final results of contracted research are often unpredictable and 
difficult to describe accurately. Consequently, Soviet legislators had to develop a model 
contract that established an equitable sharing of the risks of failure. Second, the quality 
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and stage of completing of research work is often difficult to ascertain, and guidelines for 
adjudicating these issues had to be created. Third, the material incentives for both parties 
had to be established in such a way as to promote the eagerness of institutes to engage in 
important R&D projects and to create a willingness of enterprises to use the results of 
contracted work. 
 
Soviet legislators evidently considered the timidity of R&D facilities to be the greatest 
danger in expanding the use of contracts, for in 1961 legislation carefully attempted to 
encourage risk taking by research and development organizations. For example, a 
sponsoring enterprise was still required to pay an R&D facility for any unsuccessful 
research and development work. In the words of one Soviet jurist, the 1961 legislation 
made “a presumption of unconditional goodwill on the part of the contractor.”11 
Furthermore, the sanctions against low quality work performed by an R&D facility were 
considered toothless.12 Finally, a sponsoring enterprise’s payments to an R&D facility 
were not affected by the economic value of the research results, or by the length of time 
required to implement the research work into production.13 
 
In the West contracting usually involves a considerable amount of negotiation. The actual 
degree of negotiation possible during the conclusion of Soviet R&D contracts – 
especially when the research formed part of the annual plans for both -- is unclear. An 
important element of a party’s bargaining power in many negotiations can be the right not 
to conclude a contract. Prior to the shift to self-financing, most R&D related contracts 
were planned and seemed obligatory for both parties. The refusal of one party to 
conclude a contract was already considered a violation of the other party’s rights and 
could be submitted to state arbitration.14 After the shift to self-financing, the planned 
nature of R&D contracts seems to have changed somewhat, for contracted R&D needed 
to be included in the plans of only one of the parties.15 Whether the party without the 
planned requirements could refuse to enter a contract with impunity is not clear. 
 
Negotiations seemed to center most on the financial arrangements. While R&D facilities 
felt pressure to cover their costs, bankruptcy was probably never a concern, for cost 
overruns could likely be covered by budget allocations. The financial concerns of the 
R&D facilities centered largely on their desire to obtain the bonuses that resulted from 
operating at a profit and to acquire new equipment.16 The model contract of 1961 closely 
regulated the financial terms for the R&D contracts, effectively guaranteeing profits to 
the R&D facilities and generally placing them in a good position to obtain favorable 
financial terms.17 
 
Although the model contract of 1961 sought to place the R&D institute in a favorable 
financial bargaining position, it did little to undermine the real bargaining position of the 
enterprises. R&D contracts were largely concluded for small R&D projects, i.e., tasks 
that were unlikely to endanger fulfillment of their production plans. Thus, enterprises 
preserved their bargaining position by remaining relatively independent of the results of 
the contracted R&D. Bargaining in R&D contracts likely became the search for modest 
results that enable both parties to satisfy their respective success indicators. 
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 b. Reform of R&D in the higher educational establishments 
 
Soviet higher educational establishments (VUZy) employ almost one-third of total Soviet 
scientific workers. During the early postwar period many Soviet policy makers 
considered the VUZy to be too divorced from solving major economic problems and 
enacted legislation to redirect the VUZy scientific work more towards industry. One 
important legislative change allowed ministries and other national agencies to establish 
branch laboratories in the VUZy.18 
 
Economic contracts were a major tool in redirecting the scientific and engineering focus 
of the VUZy and were prominently mentioned in early legislation.  A 1957 internal order 
regulated economic contracting.19 Subsequently, a 1962 decree on scientific research 
work in higher education was passed, with the 1961 model contract for R&D work 
appended to it.20 R&D contracts were made quite attractive to VUZy, providing them with 
sources of new equipment, capital investment funds, and even recreational facilities. 
 
According to one thorough cataloguing of VUZy contract research during the 1960s, the 
early Soviet legislative efforts brought results. “Increases in the amount of contract work 
done by VUZy started around 1957. Between 1957 and 1960, the total increased three 
times, and between 1960 and 1965 it increased two and a half times. Since 1965 the 
acceleration was markedly less – 20 percent between 1965 and 1967.21 
 
 3. An Innovative Proposal: Socialist Licenses 
 
Against a background of major economic reform and constant calls by Communist Party 
officials for more significant technical innovation in industry, a relatively novel idea for 
R&D contracts surfaced – a proposal to establish a socialist license. The legislation for 
R&D contracts was targeted primarily at creating new technologies and implicitly 
assumed that valuable results would be used. Further, R&D contracts were usually 
concluded between two parties and did not address the task of disseminating the new 
technologies to other interested, outside parties. In fact, under Soviet law any outside 
parties – if state organizations – had the right to free access to any technology developed 
by other state organizations in the Soviet Union. Soviet officials implicitly assumed that 
state organizations would automatically avail themselves of newly developed 
technologies. 
 
The diffusion of new technology did not, in fact, occur automatically and the Soviet press 
began to publicize suggestions for promoting the more efficient spread of domestic 
technologies. One such suggestion, the proposal for a system of domestic licenses, was 
made by a senior official at the State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries.22 He 
proposed socialist licenses that would give state organizations the exclusive rights to the 
technologies they develop, including the right to sell them to other organizations within 
the Soviet Union. This official claimed that Soviet legislation had put those facilities 
creating world level technologies on an equal footing with those facilities that remained 
technologically backward. He implied that the backward facilities were parasitic. “Is it 
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just that the collectives working creatively and collectives that simply use the results of 
someone else’s work should have equal rights?” he asked. 
 
The original suggestion for a socialist license was cautious and opposed giving the 
licensor unlimited rights to establish prices. It suggested instead that the payment period 
for royalties be limited to five years and the amount be limited to 10-15 percent of the 
savings created by the new technologies. Further, it proposed that both civil and criminal 
sanctions be imposed on officials responsible for violating the organization’s exclusive 
rights. 
 
An official at the Riga Electric Building Factory strongly supported the creation of 
socialist licensing and joined the public discussion with a detailed account of his 
factory’s experience in developing and selling an important new technology (the 
economic savings exceeded one million rubles per year).23 His factory developed plastic 
collectors for direct current electric machines. The research and development costs for 
the collectors totaled over 300,000 rubles. Outside contracts with the Latvian Institute of 
Mechanics and Polymers, the Kuybyshev Aviation Institute and the Riga Polytechnical 
Institute cost 52,000 rubles. The factory’s own special design bureau spent 216,000 
rubles over a ten year period on salaries for 15 designers, while the factory spent over 
32,000 rubles building specialized equipment. 
 
In selling its new technology, REZ could use the 1961 model contract only if new 
research and development work was necessary for adapting the technology to the specific 
conditions of the user, Thus, when REZ contracted to transfer its new technology, it was 
unable to charge more than 7,000 rubles, even though some of the users saved more than 
200,000 rubles per year. Since the original research and development was already 
completed, it could be included into the price of the contract. REZ’s contract for selling 
the new technology could only charge for the wage costs of preparing the documentation, 
travel expenses to the new site, overhead and planned profits for the transfer. The REZ 
official, summing up his dissatisfaction with the financial terms, wrote: “We consider that 
our profit was much lower than what our factory justly deserved as the creator of an 
invention and as the pioneer of its assimilation.”24 
 
The REZ official proposed that innovating organizations be allowed to draft contracts 
that charge a client a percentage of the savings generated by the innovation. The income 
from these contracts – rewards for risk taking – would support employee bonuses and 
fund new R&D projects. Such a system, according to this official, would go far in 
addressing the present problems of diffusing new technologies throughout Soviet 
industry. 
 
The proposal for a socialist license evoked considerable opposition. One prominent jurist 
flatly declared it “incompatible with the basic principles of socialist economics.25 He 
objected first to what he envisioned as a struggle among enterprises to grab those 
inventions belonging to individuals, presumably making their owners wealthy.26 
Secondly, he believed that socialist licensing contradicted planning and would lead to 
financial disarray as funds travelled from branch to branch with no central guidance. 
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The discussion about a socialist license occurred at the same time that economic officials 
were analyzing the results of the push for greater R&D contracting. Although one Soviet 
jurist carefully mentioned that a form of socialist licensing existed in the GDR, Poland 
and Romania, he concluded, “the introduction of licensing relations among Soviet 
organizations was presently premature.”27 He suggested that Soviet organizations needed 
more experience in compensating each other for domestic transfers of technology and 
that a traditional economic contract for such transfers would be a more cautious 
approach. 
 
 4. Revising the Legislation on Contracts 
 
After almost a decade of using R&D contracts as a means to improve industrial 
innovation, Soviet legislators issued new regulations that addressed problems caused by 
the past legislation, made adjustments for the reappearance of industrial ministries and 
extended the scope of contracts to cover the transfer the use of new technologies among 
organizations. 
 
The model contract of 1961 had emphasized the creation of new technologies and 
implicitly assumed that the results of the contracted research would be used. However, a 
1968 Central Committee decree, “On Raising the Efficiency of the Work of Scientific 
Organizations and Accelerating the Use of the Achievements of Science and Technology 
in the National Economy,” preceded the new legislation on R&D contracts and stated 
prominently “that the shortcomings retarding the use of new technologies had to be 
eliminated” to achieve the Party’s goals.28 
 
Evidently the sponsors of R&D contracts did not sufficiently use the resulting 
technologies. One jurist described the situation under the model contract of 1961 as 
follows: “Almost no enterprises carry the responsibility for the use of the work they 
order, and the scientific institutes carry none of the actual results from implementation.”29 
New regulations prominently promoted the use of the technologies from contracted 
research. For example, the new model contract for R&D required that the sponsor state 
where and how the new technology was to be used.30 Clients could also make the 
obligation to use the resulting technology a condition of the contract itself.31 More 
importantly, Soviet legislators followed up their revisions of the model contract for R&D 
with a separate model contract for the transfer of technologies.32 
 
At the same time the contracting R&D facilities received more legal tools to force the use 
of their new technologies, they also lost some of the advantages they had enjoyed over 
their sponsors in the previous model contracts. R&D facilities now became responsible 
for the quality and timeliness of their work. Technical indicators could be put into the 
contract and outside experts could judge whether the resulting work met the agreed-upon 
indicators. Furthermore, if a sponsor deemed it fruitless to continue the R&D work, it 
could terminate the contract and only pay actual expenses up to that moment. Finally, 




In 1965 Khrushchev’s economic regions (sovnarkhozy) were disbanded and the 
ministerial branch system of organizing the economy was reintroduced. The new 
legislation on contracts carefully distinguished between R&D that was conducted entirely 
within a ministry from R&D that crossed ministerial boundaries. The former was 
subjected to internal ministry orders (vnutriministerskiye zakazy) and the latter, to 
contracts. Further, point 4 of the 1969 model contract clearly stated that industrial 
ministries would determine the details of their own self-financed research work. R&D 
contracting was technically applicable only for projects that crossed ministerial 
boundaries for projects outside of the national economic plan (point 6). Thus, the 
reestablishment of industrial ministries left the national campaign for greater use of R&D 
contracts concentrated primarily on the Academy of Sciences and VUZy research 
facilities, for their greater involvement in solving national economic problems 
automatically caused them to deal with other ministries. 
 
The revised regulations for R&D contracting did not establish a socialist license. 
However, the new model R&D contract addressed some of the problems raised by the 
proponents of socialist licensing and allowed for small profits (1.5 to 6 percent of 
estimated savings). The contract for the transfer of scientific-technical achievements 
rejected making any additional payments to the developer of technology stating flatly that 
(point 7): “The cost of the work for the creation of the transferred scientific-technical 
development is not subject to compensation.” Both of the new contracts were more 
generous to individuals and established sources for considerable bonuses for those 
involved in creating and disseminating new technologies. The refusal to implement a 
socialist license likely rests in its perceived threat to centrally planned priorities. 
Significant licensing royalties, if used to create material reserves for research 
organizations, could redirect resources away from priority technologies and simply 
channel them toward successful entrepreneurs. 
 
The Use of R&D Contracts 
 
 1. The Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education 
 
The campaign to make VUZy R&D programs an integral part of the Soviet industrial 
R&D effort, aided by the use of R&D contracting, appears to have succeeded. The 
number of branch and specialized (problemnye) laboratories grew rapidly during the 
1970s, from 900 to 1270. If the relative proportions between the branch and specialized 
laboratories remained constant, there would now be over 700 branch laboratories in the 
VUZy. Since the work at these branch laboratories is conducted on the basis of economic 
contracts, the rapid growth in the number of branch laboratories seemingly indicates a 
broad acceptance of R&D contracting by many industrial ministries.33 Furthermore, R&D 
contracts now comprise a significant share of total expenditures on scientific research at 
the VUZy. One Soviet writer stated that about 80 percent of all VUZy R&D in 1976 was 
conducted on the basis of economic contracts.34 The Gubkin Institute for the 
Petrochemical and Gas Industry reported that 7 million rubles of the financing for its 
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scientific research came from economic contracts, while only 302,000 rubles (about 4 
percent) came from the state budget.35 
 
Economic contracting has taken many VUZy far beyond their traditional role as 
educational establishments. In a sense, economic contracting has brought production to 
science and made many of the VUZy into seeming extensions of the Soviet industrial 
R&D effort. The Khar’kov Aviation Institute is one of the more successful VUZ 
contractors and, perhaps, illustrates the “industrialization” of the VUZy. The institute’s 
Aircraft Production Department specialized in the explosive working of metals and has 
obtained a “significant amount” of money from 18 contracts. (The Ministries of Ferrous 
Metallurgy, Heavy, Energy and Transport Machine Building and Ship Building were 
mentioned as sponsors.) Furthermore, the Khar’kov Aviation Institute’s technical 
successes led the Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy to establish a one-million ruble 
laboratory complex there. In explaining the reason for the institute’s success at obtaining 
such generous funding, one of the institute’s professors stated, “The VUZ is a nice 
‘neutral territory’ for permitting the adjustment of relations between different ministries 
that are interested in solving inter-branch problems.”36 
 
The initial legislation that brought VUZy scientific research closer to production clearly 
implied that this effort would involve both civilian and defense-industrial ministries.37 
Since Soviet publications rarely discuss the detailed activities of the defense industrial 
ministries, it is difficult to establish the extent to which the defense-industrial ministries 
have participated in economic contracting with the VUZy. One Western study showed 
that about one quarter of the unclassified VUZy inventions used by outside organizations 
were used by defense-industrial ministries.38 If these used inventions are in any way 
indicative of R&D contracting, then the “industrialization” of the higher educational 
establishments has likely benefitted both the civilian and defense industrial research 
efforts. 
 
 2. The Academies of Science 
 
The campaign to use R&D contracts also touched institutes of the Academie of Sciences 
system. Although the USSR Academy has a generally recognized mandate to conduct 
fundamental research, it has participated in economic contracts. By the mid-1970s 
contract research “accounted for 12 percent of overall resources of the USSR Academy 
(excluding capital construction).”39 A number of the USSR Academy’s institutes have 
their own special design bureaus and are, therefore, well positioned to help industry solve 
technical problems. The A.V. Shubnikov Institute of Crystallography, for example, did 
important contract work for the Ministry of the Chemical Industry – developing laser 
elements – and the Ministry of Electronics – developing film materials.40 
 
Republic Academy institutes have traditionally conducted more applied scientific 
research than have the USSR Academy’s institutes. Consequently, the Republic 
Academies participate more actively in contract research. By 1975 economic contracts 
accounted for almost 40 percent of the Ukrainian Academy’s expenditures on R&D and 
almost 20 percent of the Siberian Division’s expenditures.41 The Republic Academies 
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also have specialized and branch laboratories, bringing the research institutes into direct 
contact with industrial enterprises.42 
 
The Paton Institute for Electro-Welding is, perhaps, one of the Academy’s greatest users 
of economic contracts and a major supplier of new technology to Soviet industry (see 
table 1). Although subordinate to the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, the Paton Institute 
resembles in many ways a major industrial research institute. It has more than 7,000 
employees, a lead research institute, a special design bureau, experimental test facilities 
and two experimental factories. 
 
Table 1 
List of Soviet Facilities Receiving Paton Institute Technologies 
 
Facility Location 
Siberian Electro-Thermal PO Novosibirsk 
Izhorsk Factory Leningrad 
Power Machine Building Factory Belgorod 
Turbine Factory Khark’kov 
Power Mechanics Factory Zaporozh’ye 
Dorogobych Drill Bit Factory L’vov 
Oil_Gas Geology PO Poltava 
Oil Machinery PO Volgograd 
Dnepro Speciality Steel Factory Zaporozh’ye 
All Union Soyuz Specialty Steel PO Moscow 
Iron Alloy Factory Nikopol’sk 
Metallurgical Factory Azov Steel Zhdanov 
Metallurgical Factory Zlatoust’ 
V.V. Kuybyshev Pipe Casting Factory Makeyev 
Pipe-Rolling Factory Chelyabinsk 
Titanium-Magnesium Kombinat Zaporozh’ye 
Kuybyshev Diesel Locomotive Factory Moscow Region 
Heavy Machinery PO Elekrtostal’ 
Heavy Machinery PO Zhdanov 
V.I. Lenin Heave Machine Building PO Sverdlovsk Region 
Automobile Factory Bryansk 
Experimental Mechanics Factory Kiyev 
Lenin Machine Building PO Petrozavodsk 
Ordzhonokidze Machine Building Factory Podol’sk 
Red Giant PO Moscow 
Vatra PO Ternopol’ 
Babushina Factory Dnepropetrovsk 
Kakhovsk Factory for Electro-Welding Equipment Kherson 
Heavy Electro-Welding Equipment Factory Pskov 
 
Source: Soviet press  PO=Production Association 
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Press accounts also reported facilities at two defense-industrial ministries, Radio Industry 
and Aviation, as having received technologies from the Paton Institute. 
  
While the above list of facilities is certainly not exhaustive, it illustrates the wide ranging, 
inter-branch role that the Paton Institute occupies and is likely indicative of the goals of 
the Party’s campaign for bringing the Academy’s research closer to industrial needs. 
 
 3. Successes and Failures 
 
Economic contracting seems to have increased the ties of many of the VUZy and 
Academy of Sciences research institutes to the overall Soviet industrial research effort. 
Further, the use of contracts with ministries for above plan work seems to have added a 
degree of flexibility to the R&D programs of the industrial ministries. The incentives for 
contracts – new equipment, larger staffing, broader research possibilities, and political 
contacts – differ from the general motivation of Western entrepreneurs, but are, perhaps 
no less successful. Thus, the introduction of greater R&D contracting bears the marks of 
an administrative success. 
 
R&D contracting has not, however, overcome a number of problems endemic to the 
Soviet economy. First, many Soviet writers assert that most economic contracts are 
related to petty, insignificant research themes.43 For example, one writer observed that 
only 2 percent of the inventions created by the Academy and VUZy facilities resulted in 
economic savings greater than 100,000 rubles.44 Another notes that the uncertainties in 
dealing with outside organizations work against contracting for anything of major 
importance to the enterprise.45 Second, the actual industrial implementation of and 
broader dissemination of contracted R&D is fraught with many familiar roadblocks to 
innovation in the Soviet economy. The Soviet press has published little on the model 
contract for the transfer of R&D work, and it has likely proven a weak motivator.46 Third, 
calculation of estimated or actual economic effectiveness form the heart of R&D 
contracts, determining both the contracts’ profitability and the incentives. Yet, these 
calculations have always been a source of controversy, and it is doubtful if they can be 
accurately made in most cases.47 Fourth, the formation of branch laboratories and the 
ability of some research departments to exist on outside funding have caused some 
internal organizational problems. Some heads of VUZy have felt their authority diluted, 
and some organizations have seen their subordinate design bureaus overly occupied with 
the work of others.48 Fifth, the majority of R&D contracts are limited to one year, a 
period considered by many Soviet scientists and engineers to be too short for serious, 
long-term research and to be a cause of many premature cancellations.49 Finally, a large 
amount of contracting, especially the above plan work, is viewed by some specialists to 
be poorly coordinated and a source of much duplication. 
 
Thus, R&D contracts, while significantly improving organizational interrelations, failed 
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